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SHOULD PROSECUTORS BLOG, POST, OR 
TWEET?:  THE NEED FOR NEW RESTRAINTS 
IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Emily Anne Vance* 
 
Prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech is not a new problem.  Indeed, 
prosecutors’ out-of-court statements to the press and the public at large 
have been of concern for over a century.  Consequently, ethical rules and 
standards have been implemented to protect defendants from undue 
reputational harm and to strike a balance between trial participants’ right 
to free speech and defendants’ right to due process.  Although these rules 
and standards are periodically revised, they have not yet accounted for the 
differences between traditional media—for which the rules and standards 
were written—and social media.  Recently, however, prosecutors have used 
social media to discuss pending cases and other aspects of the 
prosecutorial function, raising concern over how social media may magnify 
both the benefits and the risks of harm associated with prosecutors’ 
extrajudicial statements. 
This Note analyzes the differences between traditional media and social 
media, as well as how those differences impact the effect of prosecutors’ 
extrajudicial speech on pending matters, the reputation of the accused, and 
public perception of prosecutors and the justice system as a whole.  This 
Note argues that the increased risks of harm presented by prosecutors’ use 
of social media necessitate new restraints to restore the free speech/fair 
trial balance and promote professionalism in the social media age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2012, Circuit Attorney Jennifer M. Joyce prosecuted a nearly 
twenty-year-old “cold case” involving the rape of a young girl.1  Both 
before and during the trial, Joyce published several “tweets” about the case 
on her official Twitter2 account.3  One week before the trial, just a few days 
 
 1. See Missouri v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 694–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Robert Patrick, 
Appeals Court ‘Troubled’ by Top St. Louis Prosecutor’s Mid-Trial Tweeting, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/appeals-court-troubled-by-top-st-louis-prosecutor-s-mid/article_036c54b6-0e7c-5ed7-
837c-901b03b799ec.html [http://perma.cc/MWS3-YM6Z]. 
 2. Twitter is a social media website where users post “tweets,” or statements of 140 
characters or fewer, that are viewable to the poster’s “followers,” who can “re-tweet” the 
original post or otherwise respond with comments. See Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, 
Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—Prosecutors and Social Media:  An Analysis 
of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the Prosecutorial Function, 
81 MISS. L.J. 549, 550–51 (2012). 
 3. Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 695. 
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before jury selection began, she posted, “David Polk trial next week.  DNA 
hit linked him to 1992 rape of 11 yr old girl.  20 yrs later, victim now same 
age as prosecutor.”4  Joyce posted two additional tweets during the trial, 
one restating the charges against Polk5 and another discussing her 
sentiments about defending child rapists.6  Then, after the close of evidence, 
once jury deliberations began, Joyce posted, “Jury now has David Polk 
case.  I hope the victim gets justice, even though 20 years late.”7 
Once evidence of Joyce’s social media activity came to light, the 
defendant moved to dismiss the case or, alternatively, to strike the jury 
panel.8  Joyce defended her posts, stating that in addition to preserving a 
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial, her position as a prosecutor and 
public servant requires that she keep the public informed about criminal 
matters and events that affect public safety.9  Further, each tweet was based 
on publicly available information about the trial.10  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals ultimately dismissed the defendant’s motion because the court 
found no evidence that any juror was aware of or swayed by Joyce’s 
posts.11 
Nevertheless, the question remains:  Were Joyce’s posts ethical?  Should 
Joyce and other prosecuting attorneys be allowed to use social media to 
discuss pending cases and other aspects of their role as prosecutors?  Or, do 
the risks of harm to the defendant and to the integrity of the justice system 
outweigh the potential benefits of engendering a more informed citizenry? 
The growth of new media, particularly social media,12 has facilitated 
information sharing within a wide range of contexts, including the law.13  
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. (“I have respect for attys who defend child rapists.  Our system of justice 
demands it, but I couldn’t do it.  No way, no how.”). 
 7. Id.  Joyce also tweeted after the jury delivered a guilty verdict, stating, “Finally, 
justice.  David Polk guilty of the 1992 rape of 11 yr old girl.  DNA cold case.  Brave victim 
now the same age as prosecutor” and “Aside from DNA, David Polk’s victim could identify 
him 20 years later.  Couldn’t forget the face of the man who terrorized her.” Id. 
 8. Id. at 694. 
 9. Press Release, Jennifer M. Joyce, City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney, Statement on 
Social Media (Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter “Press Release of Circuit Attorney Joyce”], 
http://www.circuitattorney.org/docs/Statement%20on%20Social%20Media.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/7L47-3X25]. 
 10. Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 695.  Specifically, each tweet was based on information 
contained in a felony complaint and a probable cause statement, which had been filed as part 
of the public record prior to Joyce’s posts. See id.  Thus, no confidentiality issues were 
raised. See id. 
 11. Id. at 696. 
 12. Social media has been defined as web-based services that enable individuals to 
create public or semi-public profiles and communicate with others using the system. See 
Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media:  The Legal Ethics of 
Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 151 (2012) (citing Danah M. 
Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:  Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2007)).  The most popular social media websites—
like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—enable individuals to engage in social or professional 
networking. See id. at 151–52; Leonard M. Niehoff, Of Tweets and Trials, 27 COMM. LAW. 
10, 10 n.1 (2010).  Other websites facilitate video sharing or online blogging. See Lackey, Jr. 
& Minta, supra, at 151–52.  Users can provide their identity or post anonymously. See, e.g., 
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Indeed, social media14 has a great potential to influence individuals’ 
knowledge and perspectives15 in a more extensive way than has traditional 
or “old” media.16  The expansion of social media thus raises questions 
about how lawyers may properly use these new technological platforms in 
such a way that comports with constitutional restraints and ethical rules.17  
Within the criminal justice system, the use of social media is particularly 
troublesome when the content or nature of the information conveyed biases 
jurors, unnecessarily harms the defendant, misleads the public, or otherwise 
tarnishes the sanctity of the judicial process.18  Restricting extrajudicial 
statements, however, may burden freedom of speech and provide for a less 
transparent and open justice system.19 
This tension is particularly reflected in prosecutors’ use of social 
media.20  Although ethical rules govern extrajudicial statements21 made by 
all attorneys or personnel associated with a particular matter,22 prosecutors’ 
extrajudicial statements are subject to additional restrictions23 due to the 
prevailing view that prosecutors’ statements are likely to influence the 
views of prospective or active jurors,24 especially in criminal cases.25  
Although the rules of professional conduct26 and other standards27 
governing prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech have struck a balance between 
 
THADDEUS A. HOFFMEISTER, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM:  A NEW ERA FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE? 19 (2014) (discussing how “social media provides a cloak of anonymity”).  The 
Pew Institute estimates that 65 percent of adult Americans have active profiles on at least 
one social networking website. See John G. Browning, Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your 
Enemies Closer:  Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S J. 
ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 204, 206 (2013). 
 13. See, e.g., Kendall Coffey, Defense Perspective on Media and the Court of Public 
Opinion, in MEDIA COVERAGE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES 1, 53 (Andrew E. Taslitz ed., 
2013); Amy J. St. Eve et al., More from the #Jury Box:  The Latest on Juries and Social 
Media, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 64, 67 (2014). 
 14. Although the focus of this Note is on the effects of social media on prosecutors’ 
speech, much of the analysis applies to all forms of electronic media. 
 15. See St. Eve et al., supra note 13, at 67; see also HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at xiii–
xvi. 
 16. See infra Part I.C.  For the purposes of this Note, traditional, or “old,” media refers 
to print newspapers, radios, and television broadcasts, while “new” media refers to social 
media, websites, and other online communications. 
 17. See Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 12, at 149–50. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend VI; Coffey, supra note 13, at 52–56; see also infra Parts 
I.A., II.C.2. 
 19. See infra Parts I.A., II.C.1. 
 20. See infra Part II.C. 
 21. An extrajudicial statement is “[a]ny utterance made outside [of] court.” Extrajudicial 
Statement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  See infra Part 
I.B.1 for further discussion of this rule. 
 23. See infra Part I.B.2–4 (discussing Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the ABA Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse, and other restraints on 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech). 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(“Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech.”). 
 26. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 27. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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prosecutors’ First Amendment rights and the right of criminal defendants to 
a fair trial,28 the use of social media complicates this balance because it 
magnifies both the benefits and the risks of harm associated with 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements.29 
This Note addresses how social media raises new concerns regarding 
whether existing restraints on prosecutors’ speech about pending criminal 
matters are sufficient to prevent undue harm to the defendant and the justice 
system at large.  Part I provides an overview of the issues concerning 
extrajudicial speech and its impact on the judicial process, the rules and 
standards developed to help resolve these issues, as well as the differences 
between traditional media—for which the rules were developed—and social 
media.  Part II highlights instances of prosecutors’ recent use of social 
media in official and unofficial capacities.  Part II also discusses the 
competing motivations behind prosecutors’ social media activity as well as 
how social media both increases the benefits and exacerbates the risks of 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements.  Finally, Part III argues that the 
magnified harms presented by prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech on social 
media necessitate new restraints to reduce the risks of harm to the 
defendant, the judicial process, and public perception of the legal 
profession. 
I.  OLD PROBLEM, OLD RULES, AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Because prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements have been a longstanding 
concern due to their potential to influence the outcome of an adjudicatory 
proceeding, organizations like the American Bar Association (ABA) have 
developed ethical rules and standards to promote fairness and protect the 
rights of defendants in pending matters.  Part I.A of this section provides an 
overview of the issues regarding extrajudicial statements in criminal cases.  
Part I.B then addresses existing restraints on prosecutors’ extrajudicial 
statements that were developed in the context of traditional media, 
including radio and print journalism.  Finally, Part I.C assesses the 
differences between social media and traditional media and discusses the 
rise of social media as a news source, thereby raising the question of 
whether existing restraints are sufficient to protect the integrity of the 
judicial process in the new media age. 
A.  A Longstanding Problem:  Extrajudicial Statements in Criminal Trials 
Lawyers’ statements to the media about pending cases have been of 
concern for over a century.30  This concern developed within the context of 
 
 28. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(addressing how and why the Model Rules must “strike a balance between protecting the 
right to a fair trial [while] safeguarding the right of free expression”). 
 29. See infra Parts I.C, II.C. 
 30. See Suzanne F. Day, Note, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Attorneys’ Freedom of 
Expression:  The Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1347, 
1366 (1993) (“At least since the adoption of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, 
professional legal organizations have been concerned about a lawyer’s interaction with the 
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lawyers’ interactions with newspapers, radio, and television stations.31  As 
discussed at length by many legal scholars,32 the basic premise behind the 
problem of lawyers’ extrajudicial statements about pending matters 
involves a tension between the First and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.33  The First Amendment prohibits the government from 
infringing on freedom of speech or of the press,34 while the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury.35  These rights may come into conflict when members of the 
jury are exposed to statements made by an attorney affiliated with the 
case.36 
In rendering a verdict in a criminal case, the jury must rely exclusively on 
admissible evidence offered at trial.37  Statements made before and during 
trial can expose prospective or acting jurors to prejudicial information about 
the defendant, thereby affecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury.38  Where attorneys’ speech goes unrestrained, there is a risk 
that statements regarding inadmissible evidence or attorneys’ personal 
 
media during the pendency of a trial.”); see also Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials 
in the Information Age:  The Need for More Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial 
Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 96 & n.4 (1995) (discussing how extensive trial publicity 
has been at issue since at least the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr). 
 31. See Day, supra note 30, at 1366 (discussing how the first rules restricting lawyers’ 
interactions with the media were developed in 1908, followed by renewed attention to 
attorney-media relations in the 1960s). 
 32. See, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, A Criminal Practitioner’s Guide to the Media in Client 
Representation, in MEDIA COVERAGE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, supra note 13, at 139, 
146, 148; Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence is Golden:  The New Illinois Rules on Attorney 
Extrajudicial Speech, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323, 323 (2002); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., “May It 
Please The Camera, . . . I Mean the Court”—An Intrajudicial Solution to an Extrajudicial 
Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004); Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecutorial Sound Bites:  
When Do They Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1022, 1030–33 (2010). See generally 
HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12. 
 33. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 96 & n.3; Day, supra note 30, at 1355. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35. Id. amend. VI. 
 36. See Day, supra note 30, at 1355; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 
1030, 1075 (1991) (“Few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than 
the right to a fair trial by ‘impartial’ jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial 
statements would violate that fundamental right.”).  There has been some debate over the 
extent to which publicity about a case impacts the jury. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 99 
n.15, 111–13.  Nevertheless, as discussed below, this Note concludes that the rise of social 
media has magnified prosecutors’ ability to influence jurors, which necessitates the 
imposition of additional restraints on prosecutors’ use of this communication medium. See 
Parts II.C.2, III. 
 37. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (“Due process requires 
that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.”). 
 38. See Matthew Mastromauro, Pre-Trial Prejudice 2.0:  How YouTube Generated 
News Coverage is Set to Complicate the Concepts of Pre-Trial Prejudice Doctrine and 
Endanger Sixth Amendment Fair Trial Rights, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 289, 290 (2010).  In 
general, pre-trial statements are more likely to prejudice the proceeding because the jury has 
not yet been empaneled and instructed to avoid news coverage of the case. See Minnefor, 
supra note 30, at 102.  Although measures are taken to prevent empaneled jurors from 
obtaining extraneous information about the case, these measures are not always effective. 
See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 56 (discussing ways to improve the efficacy of jury 
instructions). 
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perceptions of the proceedings will reach and influence the jury.39  
Attorneys’ unique role in the judicial process, including their access to 
confidential information, “bestows ‘a degree of credibility to their speech’ 
above that of an ordinary citizen” or the press, which makes it more likely 
that their statements will affect a given proceeding.40  Although this is true 
for prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike, prosecutors’ 
extrajudicial statements are of particular concern in the free speech/fair trial 
debate41 because prosecutors “speak with ‘the inherent authority of the 
government.’”42  In other words, given the nature of the prosecutorial role, 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements are considered particularly likely to 
influence a pending proceeding.43 
At the same time, however, prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements may 
also provide the public with important information about public safety and 
the functioning of the judicial system within their community.44  As 
prosecutors are considered public servants who are accountable to their 
constituents,45 some scholars have contended that prosecutors have an 
 
 39. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 100, 114–15. 
 40. Abigail H. Lipman, Note, Extrajudicial Comments and the Special Responsibilities 
of Prosecutors:  Failings of the Model Rules in Today’s Media Age, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1513, 1533 (2010) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 
548, 559 (Md. 2003)).  This knowledge seems to outweigh any concern that attorneys’ 
statements are biased in favor of the side that they represent. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 
114. 
 41. See Lipman, supra note 40, at 1530; see also Peter Andrew Malanchuk, Comment, 
The Court of Public Opinion:  Did Former Attorney General John Ashcroft Violate Ethics 
Rules Regarding Extrajudicial Statements and If So, Why Was He Not Sanctioned?, 32 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 237, 242 (2008) (discussing how prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements are 
particularly likely to influence pending matters). 
 42. Lipman, supra note 40, at 1533 (quoting Gansler, 835 A.2d at 559); see also Brown, 
Jr., supra note 32, at 113; Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecution, the Press, and Free 
Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 890 (1990) (discussing how “prosecutors can be the best 
source of information concerning a criminal investigation and prosecution”). 
 43. See Brown, Jr., supra note 32, at 113; Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, at 868 & n.15, 
890; Lipman, supra note 40, at 1533.  Concern regarding prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech is 
especially compelling in light of prosecutors’ principal, overarching duty, which is to “seek 
justice,” not merely to secure convictions. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 
1365 (2011) (“The role of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done.” (citation omitted)); 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (discussing how the interest of the United 
States Attorney in a criminal prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall 
be done”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate.”); Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 151, 151–52 (2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s duty [is] not to win a case but to see 
that justice is done . . . .”); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good 
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 377 (2001).  Prosecutors’ statements that convey 
partiality do not align with this duty. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 87–88; K. Babe Howell, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice 
System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 306–07 (2014). 
 44. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 59–61; R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutor and 
the Press:  Lessons (Not) Learned from the Mike Nifong Debacle, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 67, 73 (2008). 
 45. See Cassidy, supra note 44, at 73. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial 
Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) 
(discussing how most chief prosecutors are elected officials). 
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obligation to inform the public about how they are managing their 
responsibilities, which may include providing information about pending 
matters.46  Indeed, prosecutors’ speech about pending cases can provide the 
public with important information regarding the operation of the justice 
system and other matters of public policy.47  This type of extrajudicial 
speech can be quite valuable to the community because it can “educate the 
public about the legal system generally or regarding specific aspects of the 
law.”48  It can also assure members of the public that the prosecutor’s office 
is actively responding to the needs of the community.49 
B.  Striking a Balance:  
Current Restraints on Prosecutors’ Extrajudicial Speech 
Professional legal organizations like the ABA have struck a balance 
between attorneys’ freedom of speech and the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.50  Since 1908, the ABA has promulgated rules and standards of ethical 
and professional conduct, including rules governing attorneys’ extrajudicial 
statements about pending matters.51  The earliest rules were developed out 
of concern for attorneys’ published statements in newspapers, or old 
media.52  Although these rules have been periodically revised,53 the existing 
rules and standards do not distinguish between extrajudicial statements 
made via old media, such as newspapers and television, and those made 
using new media, particularly social media.54 
Part I.B.1 of this section addresses Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), which governs trial publicity for all 
lawyers.  Part I.B.2 examines ABA Model Rule 3.8(f), which provides 
additional restraints on prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech in criminal cases.  
Part I.B.3 discusses ABA standards, particularly those governing 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements.  Finally, Part I.B.4 provides 
background on other restraints on prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements, 
such as employer guidelines and judge-imposed gag orders. 
 
 46. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 44, at 73; Lipman, supra note 40, at 1546; see also 
Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Information for Literary or 
Media Purposes:  What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1809, 1843 
(1995) (noting that the public has an “interest in knowing how officials perform their tasks” 
and in “understanding how its government and representatives operate”). 
 47. See Cassidy, supra note 44, at 73 (discussing how attorney speech about pending 
cases may advance public knowledge and discussion of areas of public concern). 
 48. Lipman, supra note 40, at 1545. 
 49. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 60. 
 50. See infra Part II.B.1–4. 
 51. See Day, supra note 30, at 1366.  Although the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct themselves are nonbinding on attorneys, most states have either adopted the rules in 
full or developed rules that are very similar to the ABA Model Rules, thereby giving the 
rules force of law. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 113–14; Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, 
at 872–73. 
 52. See Day, supra note 30, at 1366. 
 53. See id. at 1368–70; see also Ted Haller, Comment, Cleaning Out the Dirty Laundry:  
Washing Out Law Enforcement’s Prejudicial Comments, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 249, 252–54 
(2014) (discussing various attempts by the ABA to address trial publicity). 
 54. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
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1.  ABA Model Rule 3.6 
Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules strikes a balance between the right of 
free speech and the right to a fair trial.55  On the one hand, Rule 3.6(a) 
prohibits lawyers working on a particular matter from making extrajudicial 
statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially affecting the 
proceeding.56  This restriction extends to other lawyers who work for the 
same law firm or government agency but are not working on the matter.57  
However, Rule 3.6 also delineates a safe harbor provision that allows 
limited disclosure in situations that are unlikely to pose a substantial risk of 
materially prejudicing a proceeding, such as the release of information 
contained in a public record or a statement that an investigation into a 
particular matter is taking place.58  As such, Model Rule 3.6 provides 
prosecutors and other attorneys with a constitutional limit on extrajudicial 
statements regarding pending matters on which they or members of their 
office are working, while also permitting some extrajudicial speech about 
those matters.59 
2.  ABA Model Rule 3.8 
Although Rule 3.6 applies broadly to all lawyers, Rule 3.8 provides 
additional ethical obligations for prosecutors in criminal cases.60  
Recognizing that prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements about pending 
matters can impose reputational harm on the accused, the ABA adopted 
 
 55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 56. See id. r. 3.6(a) (“A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the 
investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public 
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”).  Comment 5 to Rule 3.6 provides a list of certain 
types of information that are more likely to materially prejudice a judicial proceeding, such 
as information relating to “the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, 
suspect . . . or witness” or “any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect 
in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration.” Id. r. 3.6 cmt. 5. 
 57. See id. r. 3.6(d). 
 58. Model Rule 3.6(b) provides that: 
[A] lawyer may state:  (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when 
prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained 
in a public record; (3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress; (4) the 
scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in 
obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger 
concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that 
there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public 
interest; and (7) in a criminal case . . . (i) the identity, residence, occupation and 
family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, 
information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; (iii) the fact, time and 
place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or 
agencies and the length of the investigation. 
Id. r. 3.6(b).  Lawyers engaging in representation must also maintain client confidentiality 
and cannot knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to another individual. 
See id. r. 1.6, 4.1. 
 59. See id.  r. 3.6 cmt. 1. 
 60. See id. r. 3.8. 
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Rule 3.8(f).61  Rule 3.8(f) specifically provides that prosecutors in a 
criminal case shall “refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a 
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the 
accused.”62  However, the Rule contains an exception that permits 
statements that are “necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent 
of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose.”63  Thus, Rule 3.8(f), in conjunction with Rule 3.6, indicates that 
prosecutors may discuss publicly available information about pending cases 
when necessary to inform the public of their actions so long as making such 
statements would not have a substantial likelihood of affecting the 
proceeding or increasing public denunciation of the accused.64 
3.  ABA Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse 
As the ABA Model Rules provide just the constitutional and ethical 
minimums for attorney conduct, the ABA also has adopted, and 
periodically revised, standards regarding attorneys’ extrajudicial statements 
in criminal cases65 to provide best practices for lawyers regarding their 
communications with the public.66  Most notable are the ABA Criminal 
Justice Standards on Fair Trial and Public Discourse,67 which were 
originally developed in 196868 within the context of old media.69  Though 
 
 61. See id. r. 3.8 cmt. 5 (“[A] prosecutor’s extrajudicial statement can create the 
additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused.”); cf. id. r. 3.8 cmt. 1 
(“[A prosecutor’s] responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that . . . special 
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”). 
 62. Id. r. 3.8(f).  The rules further provide that a prosecutor in a criminal case must 
exercise reasonable care in controlling extrajudicial statements made by police officers and 
others working alongside the prosecutor on a particular matter. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. r. 3.6, 3.8(f). 
 65. See Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, at 873 & n.37, 875.  Although these standards are 
ethical guidelines and not laws, courts may enact local rules to give these standards binding 
effect. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1067–68 (1991). 
 66. E.g, FAIR TRIAL AND PUB. DISCOURSE 8-1.1(a)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  Though not 
a focus of this Note, the ABA has also adopted the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution and Defense Functions, which closely parallel the ethical restraints imposed by 
Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f).  Indeed, Standard 3-1.10(c) states that: 
The prosecutor should not make, cause to be made, or authorize or condone the 
making of, a public statement that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should 
know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal 
proceeding or heightening public condemnation of the accused, but the prosecutor 
may make statements that inform the public of the nature and extent of the 
prosecutor’s or law enforcement actions and serve a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.10(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015). 
 67. Prior to the 2013 revision, these standards were titled the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards on Fair Trial and Free Press. 
 68. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 134 & n.170 (discussing the drafting of the 
Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, which the Standards on Fair Trial and Public 
Discourse have since supplanted); see also Brown, Jr., supra note 32, at 97–98. 
 69. See Mattei Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6:  
Balancing the Free Speech Rights of Lawyers, the Sixth Amendment Rights of Criminal 
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revised in 2013, the standards do not focus on the differences between old 
and new media, or the effect that these differences may have on pending 
cases, the reputations of the accused, or public perception of the legal 
profession.70 
Nevertheless, the standards seek to promote transparency and confidence 
in the criminal justice system, while also maintaining the integrity of the 
judicial proceedings.71  Like the Model Rules,72 the Standards on Fair Trial 
and Public Discourse indicate that lawyers involved in a criminal matter 
shall not make any extrajudicial statements that may have a substantial 
likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicatory proceeding or “unnecessarily 
heightening public condemnation” of the accused.73  The standards further 
provide that attorneys should avoid making statements that negatively 
impact public perception of and respect for the judicial process.74 
Additionally, like Model Rule 3.8,75 the Standards on Fair Trial and 
Public Discourse provide guidelines that are specific to prosecutors.76  The 
standards outline topics that prosecutors should avoid discussing when 
making public statements about a pending case,77 while also providing an 
illustrative list of subjects that are usually permissible, such as statements 
that are necessary to inform the public about prosecutorial action and 
statements that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose.78 
4.  Other Restraints 
In addition to the ABA Model Rules and Standards, other measures may 
be used to restrain prosecutors’ speech.79  Many prosecutors’ offices 
provide additional guidance and training regarding media relations and 
statements to the public.80  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, for example, 
establishes standards for federal prosecutors’ engagement with the media.81  
 
Defendants, and Society’s Right to the Fair Administration of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
497, 500 (2007); Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile:  
Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 494, 503–05 (1993). 
 70. See generally Haller, supra note 53, at 252–59, 272 (discussing the evolution of trial 
publicity rules and prosecutors’ need for more social media guidelines). 
 71. FAIR TRIAL AND PUB. DISCOURSE 8-1.1(b)(i)–(iii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 72. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 73. FAIR TRIAL AND PUB. DISCOURSE 8-2.1(a)(i)–(ii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  The rules 
also urge lawyers to seek out the advice of their supervisors before making any public 
extrajudicial statements regarding a pending criminal matter. Id. 8-2.1(a). 
 74. See id. 8-2.1(a)(iii). 
 75. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 76. See FAIR TRIAL AND PUB. DISCOURSE 8-2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 77. See id. 8-2.2(a)(i)–(ix). 
 78. See id. 8-2.2(b). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.000 (1997) 
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL] (establishing guidelines for relations between 
federal prosecutors and the media); see also Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10 (discussing the 
imposition of gag orders on trial participants). 
 80. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.001. 
 81. See id.  These guidelines supplement the directives codified in 28 C.F.R. § 50.2, 
which also regulate what federal prosecutors can and cannot disseminate to the public about 
pending criminal investigations. See id. 
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Like the ABA Model Rules, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (the Manual) aims 
to strike a balance between defendants’ right to a fair trial, the value of a 
free press, and the public’s right to information.82  Chapter 1-7.000, entitled 
“Media Relations,” provides guidance similar to that of the ABA Model 
Rules by indicating what type of information is “disclosable”83 and, 
conversely, what type of information should be withheld from the public 
due to the likelihood that such information could influence a pending 
proceeding.84 
The Manual indicates that a press release is “the usual method to release 
public information to the media” and that press conferences should be 
limited to only the “most significant and newsworthy actions.”85  Where 
there exists a “substantial public interest” in a pending matter, the 
guidelines further provide that extrajudicial statements conveyed to the 
press should be confined to the public record86 and should not contain any 
information that has a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the 
fairness of an adjudicative proceeding.87  The guidelines also acknowledge 
that in some instances “the community needs to be reassured” that action is 
being taken in a particular matter, in which case public commentary 
confirming that an investigation is underway may be necessary “to protect 
the public interest.”88 
Judges also have the ability to restrict trial participants’ extrajudicial 
speech by issuing gag orders89 to prevent attorneys or others from publicly 
discussing the case.90  Although the standards for issuing gag orders are not 
uniform,91 gag orders are typically reserved for only the most newsworthy 
 
 82. See id. § 1-7.112; see also Lipman, supra note 40, at 1529. 
 83. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.520.  Like the ABA Model Rules, such 
information includes the defendant’s name and age, the substance of the charge as reflected 
in the public record, and the time and place of arrest. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 84. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.550.  Like the ABA Model Rules, the Manual 
indicates that Department of Justice employees should avoid discussing their observations of 
a defendant’s character, their opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, as well as 
commentary regarding the identity or credibility of prospective witnesses. Id.; see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 85. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.401(A). 
 86. Id. § 1-7.401(D).  The Manual further indicates that any public communications 
about pending cases made before or during the course of the trial “must be approved by the 
appropriate Assistant Attorney General, the United States Attorney, or other designate 
responsible for the case.” Id. § 1-7.401(E). 
 87. See id. §§ 1-7.401(H), 1-7.500. 
 88. Id. § 1-7.530(B). 
 89. A gag order is “[a] judge’s order directing parties, attorneys, witnesses, or journalists 
to refrain from publicly discussing the facts of a case.” Gag Order, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 90. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 106–07; Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10.  “Many 
judges, however, are reluctant to grant [gag] orders in light of the First Amendment.” 
HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 106–07. 
 91. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 128–30; Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10.  Specifically, 
some courts issue gag orders where “there is a reasonable likelihood that trial participants’ 
extrajudicial statements would preclude a fair trial.” Minnefor, supra note 30, at 128.  Other 
courts, however, impose gag orders “if [trial participants’] comments pose a serious and 
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cases where the danger of unfair prejudice is particularly substantial.92  
Thus, judges have some discretion to impose further restrictions on 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech when necessary to promote fairness.93 
C.  The Rise of Social Media 
In determining whether existing restraints are sufficient in the new media 
age, it is important to consider how new media, particularly social media, 
has impacted the dissemination of and access to information about criminal 
cases and other news.  Part I.C.1 addresses the ways in which social media 
differs from traditional media, while Part I.C.2 discusses how the public is 
increasingly using social media as a news source. 
1.  How Social Media Differs from Traditional Media 
Social media is distinct from traditional media in several ways.  Prior to 
the rise of social media and other forms of electronic communications, 
individuals who sought to communicate with the public had to rely on 
traditional media, namely print newspapers, radio, and television.94  As 
these media outlets could not—and still cannot—provide news coverage for 
every story, and instead elect to selectively report on only the most 
newsworthy of events, it was quite difficult for ordinary persons and 
government officials alike to make public statements that would reach a 
large audience using traditional means.95 
Social media and other internet resources, however, enable individuals to 
communicate immediately and continuously with a large audience with 
little to no effort or cost.96  Further, individuals can disseminate messages 
 
imminent threat of interference with a fair trial” or where there is a “clear and present 
danger” of such interference. Id. at 128–29. 
 92. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 126–27.  Indeed, generally gag orders are only 
issued when the measure is narrowly tailored to restrict the likelihood of prejudice and is the 
least restrictive means of doing so. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10 & n.3. 
 93. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10.  In addition to restricting the ability of prosecutors 
and other trial participants to make extrajudicial statements, judges can also take steps to 
restrict the effect of statements that have already been made or may be made in the future. 
See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 121.  Such measures include change of venue, postponement 
of a trial, voir dire, jury instructions, jury sequestration, and jury questionnaires. See id.; see 
also Mastromauro, supra note 38, at 314 & n.110, 316. 
 94. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-
7.401(A). 
 95. See 1 AM. JUR. Trials § 22 (2014); see also Lauren R. Younkins, Note, 
#ihatemyboss:  Rethinking the NLRB’s Approach to Social Media Policies, 8 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 222, 228 (2013). 
 96. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 61; Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred 
Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field:  Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 
355, 404–05 (2010) (discussing how social media enables individuals to have “a seemingly 
limitless reach”); Younkins, supra note 95, at 228–29; Devin Hamer, The Twitter Effect:  
How Social Media Changes the News Narrative, PBS (June 28, 2011), http://www.pbs. 
org/mediashift/2011/06/the-twitter-effect-how-social-media-changes-the-news-narrative179 
[http://perma.cc/7MMB-B9G9].  Facebook, for example, boasts over 1.32 billion monthly 
active users worldwide, with Americans spending an average of forty minutes per day 
utilizing the site. See Joshua Brunstein, Americans Now Spend More Time on Facebook 
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of their own creation without having to wait for traditional media outlets to 
provide coverage and without having their statements truncated.97  Because 
statements on social media can be disseminated instantly with the simple 
click of a button,98 social media posts are more likely to be impulsive and 
unrestrained than are statements made via traditional media, thereby leading 
individuals to “say things that they would never say in a direct, in-person 
exchange.”99 
 Another difference between social media and traditional media is the 
amount of scrutiny that is accorded to statements prior to publication.100  
Reports and broadcasts on traditional media typically involve extensive 
research, fact checking, and editing prior to the issuance of any 
publication.101  Inflammatory allegations and other editorializing may be 
truncated, or even fully omitted, in the final publication or broadcast.102  In 
the criminal justice context, this type of traditional oversight substantially 
reduces the likelihood that one’s statements could prejudice the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.103 
Further, reporters rarely rely on just one source.104  Instead, reporters 
typically solicit information from multiple sources, select some of the 
information from different sources, and convey information from different 
sources side by side in one article or report.105  As such, traditional media 
communications tend to be the product of thorough and rational 
deliberation.106 
In contrast, social media and other forms of electronic communications 
are like “open mikes,”107 where individuals necessarily act as their own 
editors.108  Indeed, all posts made on social media are unmediated and 
 
Than They Do on Their Pets, BUSINESS WEEK (July 23, 2014), http://www.businessweek. 
com/articles/2014-07-23/heres-how-much-time-people-spend-on-facebook-daily 
[http://perma.cc/4SG4-2794]. 
 97. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 61. 
 98. See Younkins, supra note 95, at 229; Hamer, supra note 96. 
 99. Younkins, supra note 95, at 230.  This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the 
“online disinhibition effect.” Id.  “The effect operates in two directions; sometimes people 
will reveal personal information about themselves online that they would not share in a one-
on-one conversation . . . and sometimes people will act out online and make statements, 
including . . . rants, that they would not make directly . . . .” Id. at 230–31. 
 100. See Levenson, supra note 32, at 1055–56; Niehoff, supra note 12, at 13. 
 101. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 13. 
 102. See Levenson, supra note 32, at 1055–56 (discussing the Society of Professional 
Journalists Costs of Ethics, which states that journalists should question sources’ motives, 
distinguish between advocacy and news reporting, show compassion for those affected by 
negative news coverage, and examine the accuracy of all information before publishing 
stories about criminal trials); Niehoff, supra note 12, at 13. 
 103. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 13. 
 104. See Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, at 890. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Adrienne Hacker-Daniels, Protection or Prosecution:  Julian Assange and 
Wikileaks Making Waves with a Cybersplash, in REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA:  LEGAL AND 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 111, 113 (Susan J. Drucker & Gary Gumpert eds., 2013). 
 107. Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional 
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 242 (2011). 
 108. See Niehoff, supra note 12, at 13. 
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unfiltered109 because there are “no controls or procedures to ensure that the 
content distributed . . . is accurate”110 or professional.111  Social media 
therefore enables individuals to provide a clear message of their own design 
that is isolated from statements made by other individuals, including those 
that are dissonant with the message of the social media poster.112 
As a result, individuals who read news on social media likely have 
greater difficulty obtaining balanced information because they must search 
through “a fog of brief snippets of first-person blog-speak” to piece together 
the news story on their own.113  The comparative lack of oversight also 
indicates that social media provides greater opportunities for individuals to 
act deceptively by posting false information or by commenting behind a 
perceived cloak of anonymity.114  Thus, the ability to use social media to 
provide one-sided information has improved one’s ability “to inform, 
persuade and galvanize individuals.”115 
 Social media is also distinct from traditional media due to its expansive 
reach.  Traditional media broadcasts and reports are usually confined to a 
particular geographical region or local community.116  The reach of social 
media, however, is seemingly infinite.117  Indeed, public statements on 
social media can reach hundreds, thousands, or even millions of people in a 
matter of seconds.118  A post can reach an even greater number of people as 
other individuals “re-tweet,” or share, the post with others in their social 
media circles, who may further distribute the message.119 
 
 109. See Strutin, supra note 107, at 242. 
 110. Mastromauro, supra note 38, at 291; see also Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. 
Minta, The Ethics of Disguised Identity in Social Media, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 447, 460 
(2014) (discussing how some users may choose to convey “explicitly false information” on 
social media); Vinson, supra note 96, at 405 (“Ultimately the onus and responsibility of 
inappropriate content or reckless use of social networking lies with the user.”). 
 111. See Christina Parajon Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social 
Networking:  How Current Standards Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 252 (2011) 
(discussing how social media has a tendency to encourage information sharing in a way that 
often entails reduced consideration regarding what is professional or appropriate). 
 112. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 61. 
 113. Hamer, supra note 96. 
 114. See John G. Browning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Digital Age, 77 ALB. L. 
REV. 881, 884 (2014); Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 110, at 458. 
 115. Hacker-Daniels, supra note 106, at 112. 
 116. See Christa Corrine McLintock, The Destruction of Media Diversity, or:  How the 
FCC Learned to Stop Regulating and Love Corporate Dominated Media, 22 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 569, 579, 603 (2004). 
 117. See Vinson, supra note 96, at 406. 
 118. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at xiv; Younkins, supra note 95, at 228; see also 
Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “Friend”ly Lawyer:  Professionalism and Ethical 
Considerations of the Use of Social Networking During Litigation, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 127, 143 (2013). 
 119. See Younkins, supra note 95, at 228; see also Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 143; 
Vinson, supra note 96, at 406 (discussing how social media enables individuals to have “a 
seemingly limitless reach”). 
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 Finally, social media differs from traditional media because social media 
posts are more enduring and obtainable.120  Statements published in print 
newspapers from months prior are significantly less permanent or 
accessible because individuals do not tend to retain newspapers for 
extended periods of time121 and access to newspaper archives often requires 
a membership fee.122  Similarly, a statement made in a face-to-face 
interview “lasts only as long as the words are being spoken,” barring any 
recordings of the conversation.123  However, a post on a social media 
website never disappears;124 even a deleted post can still linger, either 
because it was “shared” by other social media users125 or because it still 
exists somewhere in cyberspace.126  Thus, statements made via social media 
from months prior are readily available to those who seek them out by 
searching the internet. 
2.  The Increasing Popularity of Social Media as a News Source 
The differences between traditional media and social media are 
particularly important within the context of the legal profession because 
social media websites have become increasingly popular places to obtain 
and discuss the news,127 including news on criminal cases.128  Given the 
 
 120. See Mastromauro, supra note 38, at 339; Skinner, supra note 111, at 270 (“[S]ocial 
media sharing . . . can never truly be erased or deleted.” (citation omitted)); Strutin, supra 
note 107, at 235 n.17 (citation omitted). 
 121. See Mastromauro, supra note 38, at 338–39 (discussing how news coverage on 
social media is distinct from traditional new media due to the permanence and accessibility 
of posts on social media). 
 122. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/subscriptions/Multiproduct/ 
lp5558.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (indicating that access to the full archives from 
1851 requires paying a fee of at least $3.75 per week) [http://perma.cc/FX4E-YCFT];  
see also NEWSPAPERARCHIVE.COM, https://rsecure.newspaperarchive.com/Registration 
Subscribev13?plan=18401 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (providing limited access to 
newspaper archives at varying rates between six and nine dollars per month) 
[http://perma.cc/MR9B-WZTD]. 
 123. Younkins, supra note 95, at 229. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. (“Once something is posted, the poster might not be able to delete or control 
it.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Coffey, supra note 13, at 1; Mastromauro, supra note 38, at 337–38; Niehoff, 
supra note 12, at 12; Strutin, supra note 107, at 287; Monica Anderson & Andrea Caumont, 
How Social Media is Reshaping News, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/24/how-social-media-is-reshaping-news 
[http://perma.cc/QHA8-QYJF]; see also Pam Greenberg, Social Media:  Becoming a Trusted 
Source for Political Information, THE THICKET AT STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2013/02/social-media-becoming-the-go-to-source-for-
political-information-.html [http://perma.cc/6BPK-BKFP]. 
 128. See Coffey, supra note 13, at 1.  The prosecutions of Casey Anthony and George 
Zimmerman are two examples of criminal trials that were surrounded by significant social 
media activity. See Browning, supra note 114, at 883.  According to the jury consultant for 
Anthony’s defense, almost one million people blogged about the trial and thousands more 
discussed it on other types of social media websites while the trial was in progress. See 
Miland F. Simpler, III, Student Article, The Unjust “Web” We Weave:  The Evolution of 
Social Media and Its Psychological Impact on Juror Impartiality and Fair Trials, 36 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 275, 279, 282 (2012).  More recently, social media has played an important 
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ease of access to these various digital media fora, the public has developed 
a voracious appetite for near-instant media coverage of a wide variety of 
events, including law enforcement investigations and criminal trials.129  
According to a Pew Research Center study, half of American Facebook and 
Twitter users obtain news through Facebook or Twitter.130  Furthermore, 50 
percent of social media users have shared or reposted news stories, images, 
or videos on social media websites while 46 percent have used social media 
platforms to discuss issues or events in the news.131  Others post in the 
comment section of news articles and blog posts.132  Consequently, as 
people repost or share news on social media websites, social media users 
are becoming increasingly exposed to the news.133  Such exposure may 
occur incidentally while individuals use social media on their computers or 
smartphones for purposes other than to follow the news.134 
The growth of social media as a tool for actively and passively obtaining 
news has directly impacted criminal trials.135  Indeed, the increasing use of 
social media has greatly magnified the “opportunity to exercise persuasion 
and influence upon jurors.”136  Because surfing social media sites or the 
internet at large can expose jurors to prejudicial and inadmissible 
 
role in providing coverage of events surrounding the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric 
Garner as well as in igniting an international debate about race, stereotyping, and police 
violence in the United States. See Samantha Storey, Outrage Over Teenager’s Death Erupts 
on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/ 
us/mike-brown-shooting-social-media.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/J8QP-WBNF]; Tanzina 
Vega, Shooting Spurs Hashtag Effort on Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/us/if-they-gunned-me-down-protest-on-twitter.html 
[http://perma.cc/775C-XLBM]; see also Melanie Eversley & Mike James, No Charges in 
NYC Chokehold Death; Federal Inquiry Launched, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/03/chokehold-grand-jury/19804577 
(discussing how “social media exploded with outrage and calls for demonstrations” after a 
grand jury declined to indict a white police officer in the death of a black man, Eric Garner, 
whom the officer had put in a chokehold during an arrest for selling untaxed cigarettes) 
[http://perma.cc/BY48-L6NH]. 
 129. See Coffey, supra note 13, at 1. 
 130. See Anderson & Caumont, supra note 127. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media:  From Discovery to Marketing:  A Primer 
for Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 542 (2013) (discussing how comment sections of 
blogs and newspapers are considered social media). 
 133. See Anderson & Caumont, supra note 127. 
 134. See New Jersey v. Feliciano, 2014 WL 1577768, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Apr. 22, 2014) (describing how social media coverage of a case could reach members of the 
jury even when jurors do not intentionally seek out that information); Nathan L. Hecht & 
Marisa Secco, Juries and Technology:  Revised Texas Civil Jury Instructions Include 
Warnings About the Internet and Social Media, 60 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 50, 50 (2012); 
Katerina Eva Matsa & Amy Mitchell, 8 Key Takeways about Social Media and News, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/8-key-takeaways-
about-social-media-and-news [http://perma.cc/HL34-7HEN]; see also Frazer, supra note 
132, at 542 (discussing how social media is easily accessible on smartphones). 
 135. See Hecht & Secco, supra note 134, at 50. 
 136. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of 
Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 10 (2012). 
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information about the case to which they are assigned,137 some judges and 
court systems have adopted ways to curb jurors’ internet usage to maintain 
the integrity of the judicial process.138  The most common response has 
been improving jury instructions.139  The most effective instructions not 
only specify what constitutes social media but also explain why jurors 
should not use social media to discuss or research the case and the effect of 
such conduct on the fairness of the trial.140  Though jurors are presumed to 
follow jury instructions, there have been instances where jurors have used 
the internet to discuss or research the case while the matter is still pending, 
thereby raising due process concerns.141 
II.  SHOULD PROSECUTORS USE SOCIAL MEDIA? 
As social media has made it easier for anyone to share and obtain 
information,142 it is relatively unsurprising that some prosecutors have used 
social media to discuss cases and other aspects of their work in both official 
and unofficial capacities.143  This, in turn, has raised conflicting opinions 
about whether prosecutors should be allowed to use social media to discuss 
pending matters and other aspects of their work.  Part II.A of this section 
highlights ways in which prosecutors have used social media to discuss 
pending cases and other aspects of their role as prosecutors.  Part II.B 
addresses the competing motivations that may influence prosecutors to 
make extrajudicial statements.  Finally, Part II.C assesses how social media 
has increased both the benefits and harmful risks of prosecutors’ 
extrajudicial statements. 
A.  Prosecutors’ Use of Social Media 
As social media usage has expanded, so too has the use of social media 
by prosecutors and other attorneys.144  A growing number of prosecutorial 
 
 137. See Jay Munisteri, Symposium, Use of Social Media By Jurors—Death Knell or 
Paper Cut to Jury Trial Integrity?, 60 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 55, 55 (2012). 
 138. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 54–55 (discussing various measures to prevent 
social media usage, including “(1) requiring jurors to take an oath; (2) penalizing jurors; (3) 
investigating jurors; (4) allowing juror questions; and (5) improving jury instructions”).  
Relatedly, judges have also taken steps to dissuade jurors from using social media to publish 
information about the case or to contact attorneys, the defendant, witnesses, and fellow 
jurors. See Hecht & Secco, supra note 134, at 50–51; J. Paul Zimmerman, A Practical Guide 
to the Development of Jury Charges Regarding Social Media, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 641, 
645–46 (2013). 
 139. See id. at 55. 
 140. See id. at 56; St. Eve et al., supra note 13, at 86, 88–90. 
 141. See, e.g., St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 136, at 12–17; see also Monique C.M. 
Leahy, 141 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 7–9 (2014).  Not every instance of such activity 
has been determined to influence the proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 
288, 298–99, 304–06 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a juror’s vague comments on Facebook 
and Twitter about the trial did not prejudice the defendant). 
 142. See supra Part I.C. 
 143. See infra Part II.A. 
 144. See Robert Ambrogi, Lawyers’ Social Media Use Grows Modestly, ABA Annual 
Tech Survey Shows, LAWSITES BLOG (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/ 
2013/08/lawyers-social-media-use-continues-to-grow-aba-annual-tech-survey-shows.html 
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offices have established official, online presences on social media to 
communicate with the public.145  Additionally, some prosecutors have used 
social media in unofficial and unauthorized capacities to post about cases 
and other aspects of the prosecutorial function.146  Recently there have been 
a few instances147 in which prosecutors’ social media activity has raised 
public or judicial concern.148  Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 below highlight 
instances in which prosecutors have used social media to discuss cases and 
other aspects of their work while posting in official and unofficial 
capacities, respectively. 
1.  Official Use of Social Media 
Many prosecutors and prosecutorial offices have created official social 
media profiles to communicate with the public.149  Some profiles, like that 
 
[http://perma.cc/C2AG-XC3W].  A significant percentage of attorneys have some form of a 
social media presence, be it through a blog or, more simply, a profile on a social networking 
site. See id.; John Schwartz, A Legal Battle:  Online Attitude vs. Rules of Bar, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 2009, at A1. 
 145. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 146. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 147. Few cases may exist on this issue because social media is relatively new. See 
Niehoff, supra note 12, at 10. 
 148. See infra Part II.A.1–2.  It should be noted that prosecutors are not the only members 
of the legal profession who have been scrutinized for their social media activity.  Civil 
attorneys, criminal defense attorneys, and judges have similarly fallen prey to skirting ethical 
rules or otherwise arousing concern due to their use of social media to discuss matters 
pertaining to their work in the legal profession. See, e.g., In re McCool, 2015-B-0284, 2015 
WL 3972684 (La. June 30, 2015) (disbarring an attorney who used Twitter and an online 
petition in an attempt to influence the outcome of pending child custody cases by directing 
readers to contact the judges involved with those cases and ask the judges to review evidence 
that they had declined to consider); Browning, supra note 12, at 223 (discussing how a judge 
declared a mistrial after a public defender, whose client was facing murder charges, posted a 
photograph of her client’s leopard print underwear on Facebook with the caption “proper 
attire for trial,” in addition to a statement in which she seemed to question her client’s 
innocence); Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising From Lawyers’ Use of (and 
Refusal to Use) Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179, 193 (2011) (describing how a judge was 
removed from the bench after evidence came to light that she had pseudonymously posted 
more than eighty comments on a local news website, many of which pertained to cases that 
were tried before her, including a high-profile murder case). 
 149. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105–06 (discussing prosecutors who have 
created Facebook or Twitter accounts to post information in an official capacity); Amanda 
Marrazzo, Prosecutors Vary in Use of Social Media, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-27/news/ct-tl-lake-county-social-media-
20130328_1_social-media-twitter-account-facebook-page (discussing how some 
prosecutorial offices in Chicago created official Facebook and Twitter accounts to 
communicate with the public and promote transparency by publishing public information 
such as press releases, indictments, and information regarding public safety) 
[http://perma.cc/L46V-GBKQ].  Defense attorneys have also created social media pages to 
communicate with the public about pending cases. See, e.g., HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 
106–08 (explaining how defense attorney Mark O’Mara used social media to communicate 
with the public during his representation of George Zimmerman when he was tried and 
acquitted of second-degree murder for the death of Trayvon Martin).  Even some state court 
systems and bar associations have begun using social media to provide case updates. See 
Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 131. 
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of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), represent the office as a whole,150 
while others represent the appointed or elected prosecutor individually.151  
Although social media is certainly not the only means through which 
prosecutors inform the public,152 prosecutors and their offices are 
increasingly using social media to publish information about pending 
charges,153 guilty pleas,154 verdicts,155 sentencing,156 office initiatives,157 
and other topics of public interest.158 
Though the majority of posts appear to satisfy professional and ethical 
standards, some prosecutors go further by disseminating their personal 
views on crime, the law, and the justice system in ways that may seem 
informal and arguably less professional than statements made through 
 
 150. E.g., Circuit Attorney’s Office, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
circuitattorney (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/NU56-YAZJ]; Justice 
Department (@TheJusticeDept), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/thejusticedept (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JZM3-PBKL]; US Attorney SDNY (@SDNYnews), 
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/sdnynews (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/427B-
QS6T]. 
 151. See, e.g., Cyrus Vance, Jr. (@ManhattanDA), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ 
ManhattanDA (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/Z57F-X5LU]; Jennifer M. Joyce 
(@JenniferJoyceCA), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/jenniferjoyceca (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/DH29-SHB7].  The author of this Note has no knowledge of any 
relation to Cyrus Vance, Jr. 
 152. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 1-7.530(A)–(B) (discussing how press 
releases remain the usual form of communication and how press conferences are reserved for 
the most newsworthy of matters). 
 153. See, for example, City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney Jennifer M. Joyce’s tweet from 
December 12, 2014, in which she posted the name of the accused, the charges against him, 
the neighborhood in which the conduct occurred, as well as a link to information contained 
in the public record. Circuit Attorney (@stlcao), TWITTER (Dec. 12, 2014, 9:53 AM), 
https://twitter.com/stlcao/status/543463780949049344 [http://perma.cc/3XPG-SLL9]. 
 154. See, e.g., US Attorney SDNY (@SDNYnews), TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2014, 3:14 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SDNYnews/status/507652986412498944 (discussing how Bitcoin 
exchangers entered a guilty plea for selling $1 million in Bitcoins for use on Silk Road, a 
black-market website for illegal drugs, among other things) [http://perma.cc/XA26-AD95]. 
 155. See, e.g., Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, FACEBOOK (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.facebook.com/MCProsecutors.Office/posts/727221974027337 (providing a link 
to a news article announcing a guilty verdict in a murder case that had been tried by his 
office) [http://perma.cc/RV46-NHX5]. 
 156. See, e.g., Justice Department (@TheJusticeDept), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2014, 2:06 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TheJusticeDept/status/542077808630304769 (stating the prison sentence 
for an armed drug trafficker convicted of firearms and narcotics offenses) 
[http://perma.cc/3RAH-NBBY]. 
 157. See, e.g., Cyrus Vance, Jr. (@ManhattanDA), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 2014, 12:36 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ManhattanDA/status/542779891159433217 (disseminating information 
about a plan to increase funding “to help end rape kit backlogs”) [http://perma.cc/3NR6-
JW49]; Justice Department (@TheJusticeDept), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:04 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TheJusticeDept/status/542047133378301952 (discussing Attorney 
General Eric Holder’s issuance of a new federal law enforcement policy designed to reduce 
profiling) [http://perma.cc/X24T-N7K7]. 
 158. See, e.g., Eric Smith (@ProsecutorSmith), TWITTER (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ProsecutorSmith/status/542051001168330753 (congratulating a local 
high school volleyball team for winning a state tournament) [http://perma.cc/9KYQ-HFKF]. 
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traditional media.159  This may cause members of the public “to question or 
lose faith in the criminal justice system as a whole.”160  District Attorney 
Ray Larson of Lexington, Kentucky, for example, uses Twitter and 
Facebook to communicate with his constituents.161  His account name is 
“Ray the D.A.,” a phrase that is “emblazoned on a superman-like avatar” 
featured at the top of his page on both websites.162  Some of his posts are 
informative, such as those that alert the public of crime trends in the 
community163 or provide parents with information regarding how to 
monitor their children’s internet usage.164  Others, however, are less 
professional, such as Larson’s response to a comment made by Attorney 
General Eric Holder in which Larson posted: 
THE EVER CLASSY ERIC HOLDER, THE MOST POLITICAL EVER 
U.S. ATTY. GENERAL ONCE AGAIN SHOWS HIS DISDAIN 
TOWARD CRITICS WHO ONLY WANT HIM TO ENFORCE THE 
LAWS HE SWORE HE WOULD ENFORCE. . . .  By-the-way Eric, 
here’s your hat as you leave.  Thanks for selectively enforcing only the 
laws you chose.  You left the U.S. Dept of Justice with an historically low 
reputation.  Great legacy.  I know the “New Black Panthers” will miss 
you.  BY THE WAY ERIC, GOODBYE!!165 
Although prosecutors’ official use of social media has rarely been of 
concern in criminal cases, there have been a few instances in which 
defendants have argued for striking the jury panel, dismissing the 
indictment, or granting a new trial based on a prosecutor’s improper 
extrajudicial statements on social media.166  Typically, these challenges 
have failed because the defendant was unable to prove that the statements 
reached the jury and influenced the outcome of the proceeding.167  In 
Minnesota v. Usee,168 for example, the prosecuting attorney made 
comments about the trial on her public Facebook page before the case was 
 
 159. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105–06; see also Brown, Jr., supra note 32, at 
134–35 (discussing how lawyers’ extrajudicial statements can tarnish the profession’s image 
as well as public perception of the fairness of the judicial process). 
 160. HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105. 
 161. See id. at 105–06. 
 162. Id. at 106; Ray Larson (@RaytheDA), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/raytheda (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PJQ4-DEDW]; Ray the D.A., FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/RaytheDA (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/LE97-
3NAN]. 
 163. E.g., Ray Larson (@RaytheDA), TWITTER (Dec. 11, 2014, 12:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/RaytheDA/status/543134504358268928 [http://perma.cc/266A-AUMD]. 
 164. See Ray Larson (@RaytheDA), TWITTER (Dec. 16, 2014, 9:11 AM), 
https://twitter.com/RaytheDA/status/544902632260001792 [http://perma.cc/JT73-UF6J]. 
 165. Ray the D.A., FACEBOOK (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/ 
RaytheDA/posts/10152808259881399 [http://perma.cc/GU7Y-KQLJ].  Some prosecutors 
have been fired after using social media in an unprofessional manner, such as to post 
politically-charged comments. See Browning, supra note 12, at 225–26. 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93, 2015 WL 1608412 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
10, 2015); Minnesota v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); Missouri v. Polk, 
415 S.W.3d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 167. See, e.g., Silver, 2015 WL 1608412, at *8; Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 201; Polk, 415 
S.W.3d at 696. 
 168. 800 N.W.2d 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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submitted to the jury for deliberations.169  Specifically, she posted a 
comment about one of the jurors and indicated that, by prosecuting the case, 
she was “keep[ing] the streets of Minneapolis safe from the Somalias 
[sic].”170  The defendant, a Somali immigrant171 who was tried and 
convicted of assault and murder charges,172 moved for a new trial, partly on 
the grounds that the prosecuting attorney’s social media activity amounted 
to prosecutorial misconduct.173  However, because the defendant did not 
present any evidence that indicated any members of the jury had been 
exposed to the prosecutors’ social media activity, and the judge had 
instructed the jury not to conduct any internet research into the case or into 
anyone involved with the case, the court denied the defendant’s motion.174 
Similarly, in Missouri v. Polk,175 the court denied the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the case with prejudice after prosecuting attorney Jennifer M. 
Joyce repeatedly used Twitter to make public comments about the case 
throughout the course of the trial.176  The basis for the denial was the 
absence of evidence indicating that Joyce’s posts had denied the defendant 
his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.177  Moreover, the trial court 
judge had provided jury instructions prohibiting the jurors from researching 
the case or using social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter during 
the pendency of the case.178  Additionally, prior to being selected, none of 
the jurors indicated that he or she “followed” the prosecutor’s posts on 
social media when asked during voir dire.179 
Although the court declined to determine whether Joyce’s conduct 
amounted to a violation of the ethical rules governing extrajudicial 
statements by prosecutors,180 the court seemed uncomfortable with the 
content of Joyce’s social media activity.181  Indeed, even though the posts 
were based on facts contained in the public record,182 the court found 
 
 169. Id. at 200–01; see also Browning, supra note 114, at 896–97. 
 170. Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 200.  At least one commentator has stated that the prosecutor’s 
post was “disturbing” and racially insensitive, particularly because the case took place “[i]n a 
city that has struggled to assimilate one of the largest concentrations of Somali immigrants in 
the country.” Browning, supra note 114, at 898. 
 171. See Browning, supra note 114, at 896. 
 172. See Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 195. 
 173. See id. at 200–01; Browning, supra note 114, at 896–97. 
 174. See Usee, 800 N.W.2d at 201. 
 175. 415 S.W.3d 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 176. See id. at 695–96; see also supra text accompanying notes 1–11. 
 177. See Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 696. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id.  One may wonder, however, whether asking this question during voir dire piqued 
any jurors’ interest, thereby inadvertently encouraging them to seek out the prosecutor’s 
social media postings, or whether the jury instructions prohibiting such conduct were 
sufficient to prevent members of the jury from seeking out this information. 
 180. The defendant argued that Joyce violated the state equivalent of ABA Model Rule 
3.8(f) regarding the ethical standards for prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements. See id. at 695; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 60–64 (discussing ABA Model Rule 3.8(f)). 
 181. Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 696; Circuit Attorney Jennifer Joyce’s Tweets Draw Ire of 
Judges, CBS ST. LOUIS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2013/12/18/circuit-
attorney-jennifer-joyces-tweets-draw-ire-of-judges [http://perma.cc/VN29-TALV]. 
 182. See Polk, 415 S.W.3d at 695. 
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Joyce’s posts “concern[ing]” and “troubl[ing],”183 in part because they 
“dramatize[d] the plight of the victim” in a way that amounted to neither a 
legitimate law enforcement purpose nor a necessary means to inform the 
public about the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s actions.184  The court 
also expressed that the prosecutor’s comments characterizing the defendant 
as a child rapist likely “heightened public condemnation”185 and that 
Joyce’s decision to make the Twitter posts immediately before and during 
the trial increased the risk of prejudicing the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
by an impartial jury.186 
Joyce subsequently issued a “Statement on Social Media” in response to 
the appellate court’s decision.187  She defended her tweets on the grounds 
that the facts underlying her statements were part of the public record and 
that, as a prosecutor, she had a duty to inform the public.188  She further 
emphasized how social media sites like Twitter promote transparency and 
provide law enforcement officials with “valuable and legitimate ways . . . to 
inform and engage the public,” thereby encouraging the public to become 
more proactive in securing the safety of the community.189  In closing, 
Joyce expressed confidence in her office’s ability to utilize social media in a 
way that balances the rights of the public with the rights of criminal 
defendants.190 
More recently, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
Preet Bharara was criticized for extrajudicial statements made after charges 
were filed against Sheldon Silver, a former New York State Assembly 
speaker who was charged with corruption.191  Prior to the grand jury 
indictment, Bharara held a press conference, issued a press release, spoke at 
a televised event at New York Law School, and was interviewed on a cable 
news station to discuss the allegations against Silver and comment broadly 
on corruption in New York politics.192  Additionally, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office published several comments on Twitter.193  Some of the tweets 
announced that Silver faced public corruption charges and provided a link 
to the office’s press release.194  Other tweets were more colorful:  “Bharara:  
 
 183. Id. at 696. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Press Release of Circuit Attorney Joyce, supra note 9; see also Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Ill-Timed Tweets By Prosecutor Don’t Merit Reversal, Appeals Court Says,  
A.B.A. J. (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ill-
timed_tweets_by_prosecutor_dont_merit_reversal_appeals_court_says [http://perma.cc/ 
M7XJ-6S3E]. 
 188. See Press Release of Circuit Attorney Joyce, supra note 9. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93, 2015 WL 1608412, at *1–3, *5 n.8 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015); Peter J. Henning, Fervent Preet Bharara Gets a Judicial Scolding, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/dealbook/ 
fervent-preet-bharara-gets-a-judical-scolding.html [http://perma.cc/Q69M-HZKV]. 
 192. See Silver, 2015 WL 1608412, at *1–3. 
 193. See id. at *2; Henning, supra note 191. 
 194. See Silver, 2015 WL 1608412, at *2. 
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Silver monetized his position as Speaker of the Assembly in two principal 
ways & misled the public about his outside income” and “Bharara:  
Politicians are supposed to be on the ppl’s payroll, not on secret retainer to 
wealthy special interests they do favors for.”195 
After the grand jury issued an indictment charging Silver with honest 
services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, and extortion, Silver filed a 
motion to dismiss the indictment, or at least poll the grand jurors to 
determine if they were influenced by the extrajudicial statements.196  Silver 
argued that the extrajudicial statements were prejudicial because they 
reflected Bharara’s opinion that Silver was guilty.197 
In denying Silver’s motion, the court noted that dismissing an indictment 
because of a defect in the grand jury proceedings is a “‘drastic remedy’ that 
is ‘rarely used’”198 and that here there was no evidence that Bharara’s 
comments substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict 
Silver.199  Nevertheless, the court indicated that certain extrajudicial 
statements may “blur the distinction between legitimate public commentary 
and improper opinion”200 and further emphasized that “[t]his is especially 
true in the context of Twitter communications.”201  The court found 
meritless the Government’s argument that Bharara’s Twitter posts should 
be read in the context of his other extrajudicial statements, such as the press 
release, which arguably made it clearer that the charges against Silver were 
still just allegations.202  Indeed, the court explained that the aforementioned 
tweets203 did not contain links to the press release or complaint and that the 
Government’s “argument disregards the substantial known risk that, in 
communicating via a platform that limits messages to 140 characters and 
permits readers to ‘retweet’ a single communication, one’s statements will 
in fact be read in isolation.”204 
2.  Unofficial Use of Social Media 
Although public social media profiles like the ones in Minnesota v. Usee, 
Missouri v. Polk, and United States v. Silver205 more naturally open 
prosecutors up to ethical criticism due to their accessibility, they are not 
“safe” from scrutiny merely because their social media profile is made 
private,206 or because they engage in social media activity anonymously.207  
 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. at *3. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Martinez, No. 10-CR-233S (1)(2)(4)(5), 2014 WL 
1794934 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2014)). 
 199. See id. at *6. 
 200. Id. at *5. 
 201. Id. at *5 n.8. 
 202. See id. at *5 & n.8. 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
 204. Silver, 2015 WL 1608412, at *5 n.8. 
 205. No. 15-CR-93, 2015 WL 1608412 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015). 
 206. See Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 110, at 479; see also Susan J. Drucker & Gary 
Gumpert, Thoughts on Social Media, Law, and Ethics, in REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA:  
LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 106, at 1, 1 (“[T]he distinction [between 
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Some prosecutors have used social media—with and without anonymity—
to discuss aspects of their work, be it about the general functioning of their 
office or specifics about the matters on which they or members of their 
office are working.208  In rare instances, such activity has attracted the 
attention of the courts.209 
Most notably, in 2012, the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana experienced a scandal when an investigation 
uncovered that at least two of the office’s top deputies210 had created 
multiple pseudonyms to discuss one of the office’s pending cases and used 
inflammatory language to describe the subjects of the ongoing 
investigation.211  Indeed, the deputies each had made hundreds of posts on 
the comments section on the website of the New Orleans Times-Picayune 
during the weeks leading up to the trial as well as during the trial itself.212  
The targets of some of their posts were five former officers of the New 
Orleans Police Department (NOPD) who had been convicted for their 
involvement in a controversial shooting and cover-up after Hurricane 
Katrina.213  Specifically, the officers were accused of killing two people 
and injuring four others who were all unarmed at the Danziger Bridge in 
New Orleans.214  The officers then planted a firearm at the scene and 
provided false reports about what precipitated the shootings.215 
While the matter was still pending, one prosecutor anonymously posted 
that the NOPD was “‘corrupt’ and ‘ineffectual,’ ‘totally dysfunctional,’ ‘an 
indolent agency,’ ‘a joke for a long time,’ and suffer[ed] from ‘cultural’ 
problems.”216  The same prosecutor also characterized one of the 
 
public and private social media] is increasingly blurred.”).  Maintaining a private profile 
whereby an individual restricts access only to approved users does not ensure that one’s 
social media activity actually remains private.  Twitter, for example, enables users to “re-
tweet” information that is posted by other users.  When this occurs, both the post and the 
identity of the original poster may be shared with individuals beyond the scope of the 
original poster’s intended audience. See FAQs About Retweets (RT), TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606 (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D897-
NUYV].  Additionally, users can capture screenshots of activity on any social media 
platform and disseminate another user’s post along with the other user’s identity. 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 546, 579–603 (E.D. La. 2013); 
Lackey, Jr. & Minta, supra note 110, at 479. 
 208. See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 209. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 549–50 (acknowledging the rare existence of cases to 
date wherein prosecutors anonymously used social media to violate ethical rules or 
professional responsibilities). 
 210. See id. at 550–51.  Neither prosecutor was assigned to work on the case. See id. at 
554 & n.9. 
 211. See Browning, supra note 114, at 904. 
 212. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Browning, supra note 114, at 904.  During the 
period leading up to the trial, the website, NOLA.com, was a popular news and information 
source in the community. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 213. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 548, 550; Brielynne Neumann, Note, The 21st 
Century Online Carnival Atmosphere:  Ethical Issues Raised by Attorneys’ Usage of Social 
Media, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 749 (2014); Campbell Robertson, Officers Guilty of 
Shooting Six in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A1. 
 214. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 550; Neumann, supra note 213, at 749. 
 215. See Robertson, supra note 213, at A1. 
 216. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 579. 
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prospective defense witnesses as “‘racist,’ ‘inept,’ and ‘delusional’ and 
proclaimed generally that NOPD officers are ‘crap.’”217  Other comments 
further criticized the defendants’ attorneys, defenses, witnesses, evidence, 
and testimony.218 
After the jury rendered a guilty verdict, evidence of the prosecutors’ 
conduct came to light, prompting the defendants to appeal their convictions 
on the grounds that the prosecutors’ conduct was so egregious that it 
warranted overturning the convictions and granting a new trial.219  The 
court found in the defendants’ favor in a 129-page order, which began: 
With a history of unprecedented events and acts, consideration of the 
defendants’ motion has taken the Court on a legal odyssey unlike any 
other.  With the relatively recent advent of the age of cyberspace and 
social media/networking, courts have anticipated a myriad of issues and 
potential controversies.  This Court is unaware of any case, however, 
wherein prosecutors acting with anonymity used social media to 
circumvent ethical obligations [and] professional 
responsibilities. . . .  Hence, to the Court’s knowledge, there is no case 
similar, in nature or scope, to this bizarre and appalling turn of events.220 
The Government contended that the comments posted about the pending 
trial “were neither front-page headlines nor breaking news stories; rather, 
they were remarkably low-profile musings of an unrecognizable citizen not 
known to be associated with the government, commenting beneath articles 
that related directly to the ongoing trial and were therefore expressly off 
limits to the jurors.”221  Further, there was no evidence that any jurors read 
the comments on the online news source or, even if they had, as to whether 
they attributed that information to someone with authority.222 
The court, however, determined that the prosecutors’ conduct was so 
“egregious,” “deliberate,” and “offensive” that it “infected” the “integrity of 
the proceeding,”223 thereby rendering it impossible to “cure such a grave 
 
 217. Id. at 580. 
 218. See id. at 590. 
 219. See id. at 574.  Typically a demonstration of actual prejudice is required in order for 
the judge to grant a new trial or impose similar significant remedies. See, e.g., id.; Missouri 
v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 220. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 549–50. 
 221. Id. at 618 (citing Government’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for a New Trial Based on 
(Alleged) Prosecutorial Misconduct). 
 222. See id. at 619.  The court did, however, examine the jurors’ responses to the pre-trial 
questionnaire that was administered a few weeks before the trial. See id. at 621.  The seven 
jurors who indicated that they utilized the NOLA.com website also provided responses that 
indicated that they were more likely to perceive officers of the NOPD as dishonest than were 
the other jurors who had not visited the NOLA.com website. See id. at 621–22.  The court 
acknowledged that there were many possible explanations for this correlation and further 
determined that, if questioned at an evidentiary hearing regarding whether they actually read 
the online comments in question, the jurors likely would be unable to recall which posts they 
had read or not read given that several years had passed. See id. at 622. 
 223. Id. at 575, 619.  In determining that no demonstration of actual prejudice was 
required, the court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 638 n.9 (1993), in which the Court indicated that in some “unusual” 
circumstances, prosecutorial misconduct could be so “deliberate” and “egregious” as to 
warrant the granting of habeas relief even where the prosecutors’ conduct did not 
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appearance of unfairness” even if the jury was not aware of or influenced 
by the prosecutors’ statements.224  Thus, no showing of actual prejudice 
was necessary to grant the defendants’ motion for a new trial, and the 
defendants’ convictions were vacated.225 
The Government appealed this decision, arguing that the district court 
abused its discretion in granting a new trial.226  A divided panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, holding that the “unusual” and “extraordinary” nature of the 
misconduct indicated that the defendants did not need to demonstrate the 
prejudice ordinarily required for the grant of a new trial.227  Indeed, the 
court characterized the prosecutors’ online comments as “bullying,” 
analogizing the conduct to “a mob protesting outside the courthouse”228 and 
determining that the commentary “breached all standards of prosecutorial 
ethics, [and] gave the government a surreptitious advantage in influencing 
public opinion, the venire panel, and the trial itself.”229  The Fifth Circuit 
also rejected the Government’s argument that the anonymity of the posts 
mitigated the severity of the misconduct,230 finding instead that “the 
anonymous nature of the comments . . . increase[d] their pernicious 
influence”231 and that “[a]nonymity provokes irresponsibility in the 
speaker.”232  The court further expressed that the anonymous nature of the 
online posts was particularly problematic because it “gave the prosecution a 
tool for public castigation of the defendants that it could not have used 
against them otherwise”233 and eliminated the ability to measure the extent 
of the improper influence on the venire panel, the jury, as well as the trial 
“participants’ approaches to their defense, testimony, or decisions to 
testify.”234 
 
substantially affect the jury’s deliberations. See Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 575, 619. But see 
United States v. Jackson, 22 F. Supp. 3d 636, 645 (E.D. La. 2014) (declining to warrant the 
same remedy to another defendant about whom at least one member of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office had posted because that prosecutor’s conduct was “insufficient to establish . . . a 
pattern, policy or practice of using online comments to bias the Grand Jurors” against this 
particular defendant); see also Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976) 
(noting that “even pervasive, adverse publicity” does not by itself render a trial unfair). 
 224. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 619. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See United States v. Bowen, No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029, at *9 (5th Cir. Aug. 
18, 2015).  The Government also contended that the district court judge was a non-neutral 
arbiter and moved for his removal from future proceedings. See id. at *19.  The Fifth Circuit, 
however, held that the Government’s motion was meritless. See id. at *20. 
 227. Id. at *14, *16. But see United States v. McRae, No. 14-30995, 2015 WL 4542651, 
at *1, *7–8 (5th Cir. July 28, 2015) (denying a new trial request to a former New Orleans 
police officer convicted of different crimes in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina because he 
failed to establish actual or presumed prejudice stemming from the same anonymous 
postings at issue in Bowen). 
 228. Bowen, 2015 WL 4925029, at *18. 
 229. Id. at *14. 
 230. See id. at *14, *17. 
 231. Id. at *15. 
 232. Id. at *18. 
 233. Id. at *16. 
 234. Id. at *18. 
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In addition to anonymous posts on news sites, some prosecutors engage 
in unofficial use of social media by maintaining anonymous blogs.235  Some 
blog to vent or provide humor.236  Other prosecutors blog to promote 
transparency, at least in part, by providing information about the scope of 
the prosecutorial role237 and the nature of the criminal justice system.238  
Sometimes this includes discussing high profile cases with which they and 
their offices are unaffiliated.239  When it comes to their own matters, 
however, at least some prosecutors who blog strive to avoid discussing their 
pending cases.240  Nevertheless, even some prosecutors who have expressly 
 
 235. See, e.g., MISTER DISTRICT ATTORNEY, http://misterda.blogspot.com (last  
visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/R7J7-888Q]; PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION, 
http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ 
YX9B-9EKG].  The ABA nominated Prosecutor’s Discretion as one of the top legal blogs, 
or “blawgs,” of 2014. Blawg 100, A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/blawg100  
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/YTZ3-H2J2]; ABA Top 100 Nominee!, 
PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion. 
blogspot.com/2014/12/aba-top-100-nominee.html [http://perma.cc/2M3X-P9W4].  Although 
prosecutors are the focus of this Note, some criminal defense attorneys and judges have also 
maintained blogs to discuss aspects of their work and the legal profession. See, e.g., A 
PUBLIC DEFENDER, http://apublicdefender.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (blog maintained 
by a criminal defense attorney) [http://perma.cc/C52D-W9AZ]; DEFENDING PEOPLE, 
http://blog.bennettandbennett.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (same) [http://perma.cc/ 
M3YV-9ME2]; NEW YORK CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY BLOG, http://www.newyork 
criminaldefenseattorneyblog.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (same) [http://perma.cc/45TL-
TJDQ]; see also David G. Savage, Judge Under Fire for Blog Post on Hobby Lobby Case, 
L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-blogging-judge-20140710-
story.html (discussing the content of and reactions to blog posts of a federal judge) 
[http://perma.cc/P9FE-YX8A]. 
 236. See, e.g., WHAT THE PROSECUTORS, http://whattheprosecutors.tumblr.com (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/D9TN-TTQD]. 
 237. See A Trial Nobody Cares About, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Oct. 27, 2014, 9:53 
PM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2014/10/a-trial-nobody-cares-about.html 
(“Part of this site’s purpose is to provide a glimpse into the world of the prosecutor.”) 
[http://perma.cc/T63X-SGG2]; Welcome!, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Aug. 21,  
2011, 11:10 PM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2011/08/welcome.html 
[http://perma.cc/KU8V-JZ33]; see also So, What Do Prosecutors Do, Anyway?, MISTER 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY (Oct. 12, 2004, 6:59 PM), http://misterda.blogspot.com/2004/10/so-
what-do-prosecutors-do-anyway.html (discussing some of the roles and responsibilities of 
prosecutors) [http://perma.cc/5VRW-XFAE]. 
 238. See, e.g., Confessions of a Facebook Stalker, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Sept. 11, 
2011, 9:48 PM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2011/09/beware-facebook-
posts.html (describing how prosecutors use Facebook to cross-examine witnesses to test their 
credibility) [http://perma.cc/X8AR-KLTY]; Path of a Criminal Case, PROSECUTOR’S 
DISCRETION (Sept. 8, 2011, 10:59 PM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/ 
2011/09/path-of-criminal-case.html (discussing the various steps in the criminal justice 
process) [http://perma.cc/UX4K-GJE4]; Plea Bargaining, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Oct. 
10, 2011, 1:21 PM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2011/10/plea-bargaining.html 
(discussing the various factors that prosecutors consider in offering a reduced plea) 
[http://perma.cc/HH8V-2C66]. 
 239. See, e.g., Trayvon Martin and Justification, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Mar. 28, 
2012, 7:45 AM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2012/03/trayvon-martin-and-
justification.html [http://perma.cc/W7FR-XBE5]. 
 240. See A Difficult Week, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (May 8, 2014, 10:35 PM), 
http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2014/05/a-difficult-week.html (“One of the rules 
of this blog is that I cannot discuss pending cases, for both legal and ethical reasons.”) 
[http://perma.cc/7UN4-KHR2]; see also A Trial Nobody Cares About, supra note 237. 
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articulated that they cannot blog about ongoing matters have discussed 
pending cases to which they have been assigned in their blog posts.241  
Although such posts typically do not contain any names, legal analysis, or 
discussion of the particular evidence intended to be introduced at trial, some 
posts seem to convey a presumption of the defendants’ guilt,242 which 
arguably runs afoul to the prosecutor’s role as a minister of justice.243 
In addition to anonymous blogging, some prosecutors post unofficially 
and without authorization by way of their personal social media profiles.  
One assistant state prosecutor, for example, posted on his private Facebook 
page about his “trial from hell,” characterizing the defendant as a “gang 
banger” and the defense attorney as a “weasel face” in a poem that he wrote 
to the tune of the Gilligan’s Island theme song.244  He posted the poem 
 
 241. The anonymous prosecutor who maintains the Prosecutor’s Discretion blog, for 
example, posted on the morning of a trial, “Trial today.  Robbery case.  Four men (16 year 
old boys really) jumped and robbed a man of money and a cell phone as he walked to the 
store.” One Witness Too Many, PROSECUTOR’S DISCRETION (Apr. 9, 2012, 8:57 AM), 
http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2012/04/one-witness-too-many.html 
[http://perma.cc/K72K-XAMJ].  In another post, he discussed another upcoming trial, 
stating, “The defendant and his buddy burglarized a string of stores across New York State.  
Jury selection on Monday and the trial should begin on Tuesday.  So far, we’ve pre-marked 
75 pieces of evidence and are calling twenty witnesses.” A Difficult Witness, PROSECUTOR’S 
DISCRETION (Feb. 3, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://prosecutorsdiscretion.blogspot.com/2012/02/ 
difficult-witness.html [http://perma.cc/PCT4-U4RL]. 
 242. See, e.g., A Difficult Witness, supra note 241 (affirmatively stating that the defendant 
“burglarized a string of stores” even though he had yet to be convicted for such offenses); 
One Witness Too Many, supra note 241 (stating that four individuals “jumped and robbed a 
man” although they had yet to be found guilty of these charges). 
 243. See United States v. Bowen, No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029, at *15 (5th Cir. Aug. 
18, 2015) (discussing how prosecutors’ duty to do justice requires that prosecutors limit their 
public statements and “respect the presumption of innocence even as [they seek] to bring a 
defendant to justice”); see also supra note 43. 
 244. See Browning, supra note 114, at 895; DiBianca, supra note 148, at 191; Kashmir 
Hill, Lawyer of the Day:  Brandon White Stranded in Gilligan’s Trial, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 
22, 2010, 12:47 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/04/lawyer-of-the-day-brandon-white 
[http://perma.cc/A5UP-J58S].  The full text of the post was as follows: 
Just sit right back and you’ll hear a tale, a tale of a fateful trial, 
That started from this court in St. Lucie County. 
The lead prosecutor was a good woman, the 2nd chair was totally awesome, 
Six jurors were ready for trial that day for a four hour trial, a four hour trial. 
The trial started easy enough but then became rough. 
The judge and jury confused, 
If not for the courage of the fearless prosecutors, 
The trial would be lost, the trial would be lost. 
The trial started Tuesday, continued til Wednesday 
And then Thursday, with Robyn and Brandon too, 
The weasel face 
The gang banger defendant 
The Judge, clerk, and Ritzline 
Here in St. Lucie. 
So this is the tale of the trial 
it’s going on here for a long, long time, 
The prosecutors will have to make the best of things, 
It’s an uphill climb. 
The New Guy and Robyn 
Will do their very best, 
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after the start of jury deliberations but before the jury had rendered a 
verdict.245  The case ultimately resulted in a mistrial for reasons unrelated 
to the prosecutor’s social media activity.246  Another state prosecutor made 
national news and ultimately resigned from her job after publishing an 
inflammatory post on Facebook in which she stated that the best way to 
handle violent demonstrations in Baltimore arising from the death of a man 
who died from a spinal injury sustained while in police custody was to 
shoot the protestors.247 
B.  Prosecutors’ Competing Motivations to Make Extrajudicial Statements 
In evaluating what, if any, additional restraints should be put in place to 
restrict prosecutors’ social media activity, it is important to consider why 
prosecutors may choose to post information or comment on social media.  
Prosecutors may have many different reasons for engaging in such activity, 
some of which may raise concerns.  Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 address some of 
the legitimate and illegitimate motivations behind prosecutor’s extrajudicial 
speech on social media, respectively. 
1.  Legitimate Motivations 
As Circuit Attorney Joyce articulated in her Statement on Social Media, 
prosecutors are government officials and public servants who have an 
informational motive for making extrajudicial statements.248  Thus, some 
prosecutors may elect to make extrajudicial statements to warn the public of 
certain dangers, update the public on events occurring within the 
prosecutor’s office or justice system, or provide information about matters 
that may not be receiving attention from the press.249  Additionally, the 
interests of justice and a fair judicial process might motivate prosecutors to 
correct inaccuracies in stories that are being reported in the press.250 
 
To make sure justice is served 
In the hornets [sic] nest. 
No rules of evidence or professionalism, 
Not a single ounce of integrity 
Like My Cousin Vinny, 
No ethics involved, no ethics involved. 
DiBianca, supra note 148, at 191 n.99. 
 245. See DiBianca, supra note 148, at 191. 
 246. See Browning, supra note 114, at 895. 
 247. See Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Michigan Assistant Prosecutor Resigns After Calling for 
Baltimore Protesters to Be Shot, HUFFINGTON POST (May 1, 2015, 4:13 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/01/teana-walsh-protesters_n_7190944.html 
[http://perma.cc/L86K-ZJ59]. 
 248. See Press Release of Circuit Attorney Joyce, supra note 9; see also Matheson, Jr., 
supra note 42, at 888. 
 249. See FAIR TRIAL AND PUB. DISCOURSE 8-1.1(a)(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (discussing 
situations in which prosecutors may make extrajudicial statements in order to inform the 
public); U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.530 (same); see also 1 AM. JUR. Trials § 22 (2014). 
 250. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 149.  In some situations, online reporting or 
“courtroom blogging” has resulted in news coverage that forsakes accuracy for expedience 
and newsworthiness. See Coffey, supra note 13, at 1, 18. 
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The natural desire to articulate one’s thoughts or express one’s viewpoint 
may also motivate prosecutors to engage in extrajudicial speech.  By 
assuming the role of a prosecutor, one sheds neither his innate need to 
communicate nor his First Amendment protections.251  Although legal 
professional codes limit attorneys’ “freedom to vent, complain, and gripe” 
to a greater extent than that of the average citizen,252 many attorneys 
naturally still seek to express feelings of joy and frustration regarding their 
day-to-day experiences.253 
2.  Illegitimate Motivations 
Prosecutors may also have less legitimate motivations for engaging in 
extrajudicial speech.  Reputational concerns, for example, may incentivize 
prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements.254  Although federal 
prosecutors like U.S. Attorneys are appointed, most head prosecutors are 
elected.255  Prosecutors seeking to enhance their reputation may make 
certain statements that demonstrate that they subscribe to a particular view 
on crime or that they are effectively serving the public interest.256  Personal 
concerns, such as the desire to be viewed positively by the public or the 
press, may motivate such statements.  Additionally, political pressures, such 
as reelection concerns or the desire to advance to a higher position, may 
incentivize prosecutors to make extrajudicial statements.257 
In some situations these pressures may result in a “win-at-all-costs 
mentality,” which can encourage some prosecutors to skirt ethical rules to 
secure convictions that increase the likelihood of being reelected by the 
public or of being appointed or hired for a different job in the future.258  
Thus, some prosecutors may intentionally seek to manipulate the press and 
 
 251. See Skinner, supra note 111, at 258; see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 
1030, 1075 (1991) (discussing how the government’s interest in regulating speech must 
always be weighed against an individual’s First Amendment interests). 
 252. Shannon Awsumb & Karen Wells Roby, The Intersection of Online 
Communications and Legal Ethics, 59 FED. LAW. 33, 33 (2012). 
 253. See Skinner, supra note 111, at 258 (“[A]ttorneys, like other professionals, vent 
about work and clients through social media.” (citation omitted)); see also Glavin, supra 
note 46, at 1809 (discussing how some attorneys provide “behind-the-scenes” accounts of 
certain cases by writing books). 
 254. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2464, 2472 (2004) (“Prosecutors are particularly concerned about their reputations 
because they are a politically ambitious bunch.”); Michael C. Smith, Social Media Update, 
62 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 197, 205 (2013). 
 255. See Bibas, supra note 45, at 985–86. 
 256. See id. (discussing how prosecutors may seek to show that they are “tough[] on 
crime” or that they support initiatives like less punitive measures for drug crimes). 
 257. See id. at 983; Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far:  Why the Supreme 
Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); 
Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, at 888; Victor Streib, Media Misuse:  Criminal Lawyer 
Advertising and Prosecutor Campaigning Under the Guise of the Public’s Need to Know, 34 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2008) (noting that lawyers may be tempted to use trial publicity 
to enhance their own image or career). See generally Smith, supra note 43, at 399 
(discussing how political and public pressure is impossible for prosecutors to avoid). 
 258. See Brink, supra note 257, at 9, 18. 
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prospective or active jurors by leaking false, inadmissible, or misleading 
information to advance the government’s case against a particular 
defendant.259  Others may seek to influence the defendant, hoping that 
particularly extensive media coverage might entice the defendant to enter a 
guilty plea.260  These influences are particularly prominent in high profile 
cases in which prosecutors face immense pressure to make arrests and 
secure convictions quickly.261 
C.  How Social Media Increases the Benefits and Exacerbates the Harms  
of Prosecutors’ Extrajudicial Statements 
As social media makes it easier for prosecutors to act on these competing 
motivations when deciding whether to make extrajudicial statements,262 it is 
also important to consider how social media changes the effects of 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech.  Part II.C.1 of this section addresses the 
increased benefits of prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech on social media 
while Part II.C.2 discusses how social media magnifies the harmful risks 
associated with prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements. 
1.  Increased Benefits of Prosecutors’ Extrajudicial Speech 
Prosecutors’ use of social media may positively impact relations between 
prosecutors’ offices and the public at large.  This section explores how 
prosecutors can use social media to more easily communicate with the 
public and provide greater transparency that may improve public perception 
of prosecutors. 
 Prosecutors’ use of social media may engender a more informed 
citizenry.263  As previously discussed, the public increasingly uses social 
media to obtain news and exchange information,264 which has led some to 
contend that law enforcement officials can connect with citizens 
successfully only through social media.265  Because social media is cheap 
and easy to use,266 prosecutors can easily disseminate information about 
matters of public interest and potentially better reach more citizens more 
regularly than can be accomplished through traditional media, which may 
 
 259. See Minnefor, supra note 30, at 100, 114–15. 
 260. See Matheson, Jr., supra note 42, at 889; see also United States v. Bowen, 969 F. 
Supp. 2d 546, 620 (E.D. La. 2013) (discussing an FBI Agent’s comments that pre-trial media 
coverage can put pressure on subjects to confess or cooperate in a pending investigation or 
trial). 
 261. See Brink, supra note 257, at 9; see also Bibas, supra note 45, at 984 (discussing 
how O.J. Simpson’s acquittal likely contributed to Los Angeles District Attorney Gil 
Garcetti’s defeat in the 2000 election). 
 262. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 263. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 105; see also Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 
131 (discussing how social media affords the public “easier access to the intricacies of the 
wheels of justice”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (discussing how vital 
societal interests are advanced through the dissemination of information regarding legal 
matters). 
 264. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 265. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 59. 
 266. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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not provide complete coverage (or any coverage at all) on matters of public 
interest.267 
 Furthermore, prosecutors can use social media to make statements that 
solicit responses from the community.268  Unlike traditional media, social 
media provides for two-way communication.269  Prosecutors therefore may 
use social media to engage with the public to assess community needs and 
concerns in a more impactful and direct way. 
 A more informed citizenry may result in further benefits to the 
prosecutor’s office and to the public at large.  More information about the 
nature of the prosecutorial function and the matters to which the prosecutor 
is attending can increase transparency and openness270 as well as improve 
the public’s perception of the prosecutor’s office and the justice system as a 
whole.271  Prosecutors’ blogs, for example, can provide the public with a 
more comprehensive understanding of prosecutorial discretion and decision 
making.272  Improved public perception of the prosecutor’s office may have 
the added benefit of strengthening community ties and improving support 
for law enforcement, which may in turn help disincentivize criminal 
activity.273 
2.  Exacerbated Harms of Prosecutors’ Extrajudicial Speech 
Prosecutors’ use of social media to make extrajudicial statements also 
exacerbates the potential harms stemming from prosecutors’ speech.  This 
section explores such risks, which include influencing a pending matter, 
imposing reputational harm on the accused, misleading the public, and 
tarnishing public perception of prosecutors or the justice system as a 
whole.274 
Prosecutors’ use of social media increases the risk that their extrajudicial 
statements will affect a pending investigation or proceeding.275  
 
 267. See supra Part I.C.1; see also Boothe-Perry, supra note 118, at 131. 
 268. See generally HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 60–61 (discussing how police 
departments have used social media to converse with local citizens). 
 269. See id. at 61. 
 270. See HOFFMEISTER, supra note 12, at 60.  An open criminal justice system is widely 
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Traditionally, prosecutors avoid speaking about pending matters because 
the so-called “trial in the newspapers” routinely draws the ire of judges.276  
Press conferences and other announcements that attract journalists are 
typically reserved only for the most newsworthy cases once an indictment is 
filed, and rarely afterward.277  Consequently, most matters do not generate 
much, if any, media attention.  Social media, however, “has the potential to 
give many trials a higher profile than they might otherwise enjoy.”278  This 
is true even for seemingly mundane cases.279 
Further, given their public nature and ability to be “shared” or otherwise 
redistributed by members of the public, prosecutors’ statements on social 
media have a nearly limitless reach280 and are more permanent and 
accessible than prosecutors’ statements published via traditional media 
reports.281  Because citizens are becoming increasingly exposed to news 
coverage on social media,282 prospective jurors are more likely to become 
aware of pre-trial publicity for a particular case.  This risk may increase as 
citizens become more aware of the social media presence of their local 
prosecutors, whose social media posts they may elect to actively follow. 
The risks of prosecutors’ social media use to the fairness of a proceeding 
may persist even after jurors are selected and have been instructed by the 
judge not to discuss or conduct any research.283  The ubiquity of social 
media and individuals’ attachment to it increase the likelihood that jurors 
will violate instructions, either intentionally or accidentally.284  Moreover, 
as social media statements are unfiltered and often one-sided, prospective 
and active jurors are also more likely to be exposed to editorialized 
coverage of the case through social media.  This medium is more likely to 
influence jury deliberations than is traditional media coverage, which 
typically provides more balanced accounts of criminal matters.285  Thus, 
prosecutors’ statements on social media increase the likelihood that 
prospective or active jurors will view extraneous coverage of the trial. 
Although there may be no constitutional deprivation of a right to a fair 
trial if prosecutors’ extrajudicial statements do not impact the jury’s 
deliberations,286 the prosecutors’ statements may nevertheless inflict 
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substantial reputational harm on the accused.287  Central to the American 
criminal justice system is the presumption that the defendant is innocent 
until proven guilty and that the sentence imposed upon an individual who 
has plead or been found guilty is the appropriate punishment for that 
individual’s illegal conduct.288  Given that social media activity is largely 
unmediated, permanent, and far-reaching,289 prosecutors’ statements may 
result in irreparable damage290 that goes beyond the reputational harm that 
is an inevitable byproduct of the indictment itself.291  Indeed, a simple 
internet search of the accused’s name can instantly uncover harmful media 
coverage, even when the case occurred several years prior and the accused 
was ultimately not convicted.292 
Prosecutors’ statements on social media also pose a greater risk of 
misleading the public and tarnishing public perception of the justice 
system.293  As previously discussed, social media makes it much easier for 
prosecutors and non-prosecutors alike to publish information that is 
inaccurate.294  Social media’s perceived anonymity may breed 
indiscretion,295 leading some to mistakenly believe that they can circumvent 
ethical rules so long as their statements remain anonymous.296  Indeed, 
purported anonymity likely influenced the prosecutors in United States v. 
Bowen297 when they decided to comment pseudonymously on the NOPD 
and the conduct of its officers.298 
Moreover, even social media activity that is not anonymous or 
misleading can compromise public perception of prosecutors, attorneys, and 
the integrity of the judicial system as a whole.299  Due to the ease of use and 
wide reach of social media, prosecutors’ statements are more likely to be 
informal, impulsive, and arguably less professional than are statements 
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made via traditional media.300  This may lead the public to question the 
efficacy of its local prosecutors and the fairness of the justice process.301 
III.  THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORS’ 
EXTRAJUDICIAL SPEECH IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
As the public becomes more interested in the news302 and increasingly 
skeptical of prosecutors and the justice system as a whole,303 prosecutors 
and other government officials may need to take more meaningful steps to 
promote transparency and increase public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.  Social media is a potential avenue through which prosecutors can 
achieve these goals successfully.304  However, there is little doubt that 
prosecutors’ use of social media may also exacerbate the harms of 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech, including denying defendants’ their right 
to due process, imposing undue reputational damage, misleading the public, 
and more.305  As such, additional restraints are needed to curb the potential 
damage that social media can have on defendants, the public, and the justice 
system as a whole. 
This Part argues that ABA Standards, state and local ethical rules, 
employer manuals like the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, and other resources that 
provide guidance on the prosecutorial function should include specific 
restraints on prosecutors’ use of social media to maintain the balance 
between prosecutors’ freedom of speech and the fair administration of 
justice in the social media age.  Part III.A contends that prosecutors should 
not editorialize on social media.  Part III.B advocates for restrictions on the 
content and timing of prosecutors’ social media posts about pending 
matters.  Part III.C addresses the need for restraints that promote 
professionalism.  Finally, Part III.D argues that prosecutors should not post 
about pending cases or other aspects of their job without authorization or 
supervision. 
A.  Prosecutors Should Not Editorialize  
When Posting About Pending Cases 
Prosecutors posting in either official or unofficial capacities on social 
media should not editorialize when making extrajudicial statements about 
pending cases.  Prior to the growth of social media, prosecutors traditionally 
relied on old media to disseminate information to the public.306  A 
prosecutor provided statements in a press release, in a news interview, or at 
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a press conference.307  A reporter would subsequently conduct further 
research.  The final coverage would include parts of the prosecutor’s 
statements alongside statements by others with information about the 
particular case.308  Thus, any editorializing that the prosecutor may have 
engaged in would likely be counterbalanced by the reporter’s other sources, 
making the prosecutor’s editorializing less likely to raise due process or 
reputational concerns.309 
Social media, however, does not have these same checks.  As previously 
discussed, social media platforms are unmediated, leaving prosecutors free 
to provide commentary about pending matters.310  Any editorializing on 
social media stands alone on the prosecutor’s official or unofficial social 
media page without being counterbalanced by statements from other 
sources, such as defense counsel.311  Further, such statements can remain 
permanently on the prosecutor’s social media page as well as on the pages 
of any social media users who “share” or repost the prosecutor’s comments 
on their social media pages.312  As prospective jurors and other members of 
the public can seek out this information or access it inadvertently, such 
statements may potentially influence the trial or impose greater reputational 
harm on the defendant.313 
Thus, while some editorializing may be acceptable at a press conference, 
it poses a substantial and unique risk of harm to the defendant and the 
functioning of the judicial process when articulated in the social media 
realm.314  Consequently, prosecutors posting on social media in official or 
unofficial capacities should avoid editorializing when discussing pending 
matters. 
B.  The Content and Timing of Prosecutors’ Social Media Posts  
About Pending Cases Should Be Restrained 
The increased risk of harm to the defendant and the functioning of the 
judicial process also necessitate restraints on the content of prosecutors’ 
social media posts about pending cases.  Prosecutors should restrict the 
content of their social media posts to procedural information, such as the 
time and place of a particular proceeding that is open to the public, and 
factual information contained within the public record.315  Furthermore, 
prosecutors should provide a neutral synopsis of the charge, including 
words such as “alleged,” “accused,” or “charged with,” when discussing 
pending matters in order to reduce the risk of harm to the fair administration 
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of justice or to the reputation of the defendant, as well as to avoid the 
appearance of partiality or unfairness.316  For example, a tweet stating, 
“Man who committed 5 burglaries to be tried next month,” is more likely to 
convey bias and produce harm than a tweet stating, “Man accused of 5 
burglaries to be tried next month.”  Posted links should likewise be limited 
to publicly available news articles, press releases, and other documents that 
are also solely based on information contained within the public record.317 
Nevertheless, including links to neutral documents, “sprinkling the words 
‘allege(d)’ or ‘allegation(s)’ liberally throughout” an extrajudicial 
statement, or “inserting a disclaimer that the accused is ‘innocent unless and 
until proven guilty’ at the end of an otherwise improper [statement]” will 
not “magically dispel[]” the prejudicial effect of otherwise improper 
extrajudicial commentary.318  Thus, prosecutors and their offices should 
take steps to ensure that each isolated, pre-conviction statement on social 
media clearly conveys that the charges against the accused are merely 
allegations that have yet to be proven in court.319 
The timing of prosecutors’ statements on social media should also be 
restrained.  As previously discussed, traditionally prosecutors have tended 
not to speak about pending matters after an initial press conference upon 
filing an indictment to avoid the ire of judges.320  Social media, however, 
enables prosecutors to provide continuous updates about a pending matter 
both before and during trial.321  As continuous posting right before and 
during trial may draw publicity that could taint the fairness of the 
proceeding, prosecutors should not post on social media about pending 
cases from the beginning of jury selection until after the verdict is entered 
in order to reduce the likelihood of impacting a pending proceeding.322  
Any need to provide the public with information to further some legitimate 
law enforcement purpose can be conveyed through traditional media, which 
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serves as a better check on prosecutors’ statements during this period when 
the jurors are most susceptible to influence.323 
C.  Prosecutors’ Social Media Posts Should Demonstrate Professionalism 
Although the legal profession requires that all attorneys adhere to a 
certain level of professionalism,324 demonstrating professionalism is 
especially important for prosecutors, “who are not only government 
officials but [are] also responsible for ensuring that justice is fairly 
administered.”325  Prosecutors who utilize social media, be it in an official 
or unofficial capacity, should therefore ensure that their posts are 
professional and do not undermine public perception of prosecutors or the 
legal profession as a whole.326  Thus, in addition to posts about pending 
matters that are conveyed in a biased manner,327 politically charged posts, 
like District Attorney Larson’s Facebook posts regarding Eric Holder,328 
should generally be avoided, particularly when posted in an official 
capacity.  Further, prosecutors should not forsake accuracy or completeness 
in order to adhere to social media norms such as brevity or speediness. 
In addition to avoiding making statements that may undermine public 
perception of the profession, prosecutors can, and should, use social media 
to promote professionalism.329  As previously discussed, prosecutors can 
use social media to inform the public and promote transparency, thereby 
building community relations and increasing public confidence in the 
profession.330  Thus, prosecutors posting in an official capacity should be 
encouraged to provide information about the general nature of the justice 
process, initiatives on which the office is working,331 and other matters of 
public interest332 so long as their posts do not affect a pending proceeding 
or risk imposing additional reputational harm on the defendant.333 
D.  Unofficial, Unauthorized Posts Should Be Avoided 
Additionally, prosecutors should not post on social media about cases or 
office operations without authorization or oversight.334  Although blogging 
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and other unauthorized social media activity by prosecutors may promote 
transparency by providing greater insight into the prosecutorial function,335 
the risk of posting in an unprofessional manner, be it about pending cases or 
other topics, is substantial.336  Individuals posting in an official capacity are 
more likely to self-censor either by obtaining approval from their public 
relations team or by recognizing that their post reflects an official stance, 
which in turn may give individuals more reason to pause before posting 
than they would when posting in an unofficial capacity.  As previously 
discussed, social media typically involves less inhibition than statements 
made through other mediums.337  This is especially true when an individual 
is posting anonymously, after a long day of work, or during a quick break 
when they do not have time to thoroughly consider whether they should 
post a particular statement, all of which are characteristic of social media 
activity.  Further, the effective permanence of posts on social media 
indicates that there is no turning back once a prosecutor has pressed “send,” 
leaving the information readily accessible online even for months after the 
initial post.338 
Nevertheless, even if prosecutors do post on social media in an unofficial 
capacity, discussion of pending cases should be avoided, as should 
discussion of other aspects of the office that could be viewed as 
unprofessional.339  Instead, prosecutors should confine their posts to general 
discussions about the law, the stages of the judicial process, and other 
aspects of the prosecutorial function that may promote transparency without 
hindering a particular defendant’s reputation or right to due process, the fair 
administration of justice, or the public’s view of the profession.340 
CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors’ use of social media has destabilized the balance that was 
previously struck between prosecutors’ First Amendment right to free 
speech and defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and due 
process of law.  Although prosecutors’ use of social media can promote 
transparency, which is arguably much needed to engender greater public 
confidence in prosecutors and the justice system as a whole, social media 
exacerbates longstanding concerns regarding prosecutors’ extrajudicial 
statements.  The vast differences between traditional media and social 
media, including the way in which social media is far-reaching, 
unmediated, informal, and uniquely permanent, increase the likelihood that 
prosecutors’ extrajudicial speech will harm the defendant, the fair 
administration of justice, and public perception of the legal profession.  
Thus, additional restraints are needed to restore the free speech/fair trial 
balance and promote professionalism in the social media age. 
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